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THE GREENING OF HARRY BLACKMUN 
Stephen B. Burbank∗
Long before there was talk of a “Greenhouse effect,”1 there was talk of 
Harry Blackmun changing color.  Or at least there was in the chambers of 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, where I was a law clerk during the October 
Term 1974.2  The inspiration for the image we used to describe the 1974 
Term came not from the distinguished journalist, only then beginning her 
career and not yet covering the Court, but from a book by Charles Reich.3  
Our view of the cause of Blackmun’s metamorphosis lacked grounding in a 
theory more general (or elegant) than the susceptibility, particularly of the 
insecure, to Irish charm.  We had no doubt that Justice Brennan had made 
Harry Blackmun his project, and we thought (without seeking systematic 
empirical evidence) that the object of his attentions found them difficult to 
resist.  I well recall my co-clerk’s remark upon seeing a letter from Justice 
Brennan joining, with praise that seemed excessive, an opinion by Justice 
Blackmun.  Noting that the join letter arrived within minutes of the opinion, 
he speculated that they had passed in the halls. 
For one exposed to such powerful anecdotal evidence early in his ca-
reer, it has been difficult to accept what Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, Kevin 
Quinn, and Jeffrey Segal describe as the conventional view about judicial 
preferences, namely that they are fixed, invariant or entrenched.4  Indeed, I 
long regarded such claims as wishful thinking, either of scholars whose 
theories of judicial behavior could not accommodate changing preferences, 
or of political actors (both elected politicians and interest groups) seeking to 
project fixed preferences on to others.  My view about the scholarly claims 
has been powerfully reinforced by the evidence that Epstein and her co-
 ∗  David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
Lawrence Baum provided helpful comments on a draft. 
1  This putative phenomenon, named after the New York Times correspondent, Linda Greenhouse, 
posits the influence of the media on judicial behavior.  See infra note 12. 
2  Burger himself never talked of such things to me.  Indeed, unlike Blackmun himself, see, e.g., 
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN:  HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT 
JOURNEY passim (2005) (noting, for example, Blackmun’s critique of other Justices written on draft 
opinions), Burger never said a mean-spirited word about any of his colleagues in my presence, either 
when I was his clerk or in many meetings during the ensuing years. 
3  CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970). 
4  See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, When, and How 
Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5–7, on file with the Colloquy) 
(link). 
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authors provide in their paper.5  The recent history of judicial selection and 
the larger political context in which it has unfolded6 have made me less 
sanguine about such claims by political actors. 
Increasingly since the 1980’s, some political actors have sought to 
make their wishes come true by insisting that judges be reliable policy 
agents.7  Moreover, their efforts in the appointments area can be seen as 
part of larger campaigns, affecting both the federal and state judiciaries, to 
insulate today’s majority against the past, by disregarding precedent, and 
the future, by refusing to acknowledge evolving standards.  Whether the ef-
fort is to place those with fixed preferences on the federal courts, to pin 
down candidates for state judicial office on highly salient issues through 
questionnaires, to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to decide certain 
types of cases, or to “punish” the federal courts for refusing to reexamine 
the merits in the Schiavo litigation, the impulse is the same.8
Of course, whether political actors could succeed in making their 
wishes come true, and hence whether I should be worried, depends upon 
why preferences change and whether recent strategies, or some others, 
could be effective in entrenching them.  As Epstein and her co-authors ob-
serve, we need a theory of preference change.9  
 
5  See id.; see also, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judi-
cial Preference Change, 70 MO. L. REV. 1209 (2005) (link). 
6  See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Rela-
tions, 95 GEORGETOWN L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (link). 
7  Their efforts in that regard may help to explain why all of those recently appointed to the Supreme 
Court have had judicial experience—and judicial records—and why some presidents seem to have put a 
premium on prior executive branch experience as well. 
8  See Editorial, The War on Courts and Other Wars, 90 JUDICATURE 148 (2007), available at 
http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs_editorial-template.asp?content_id=581 (link)(“However various the manifes-
tations of these current calls for judicial accountability, they reflect one common—and very perni-
cious—idea, namely that judges are policy agents whose job is to implement the will of today’s majority 
on particular issues.”).  The author of this Post is chair of the Editorial Committee of the American Judi-
cature Society. 
9  See Epstein et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 31–32).  We may also need a dose of realism about 
preference formation.  It is not a criticism of Epstein and her co-authors that their paper, like the work of 
most political scientists, is based on only a slice of the work of only one court (and an unusual one at 
that).  Moreover, even recognizing that all current Justices had judicial experience before their appoint-
ment to the Court, the notion that they all had clearly formed preferences, even as to all of that slice of 
work, seems to me either naïve or, more likely, another artifact of the limitations of models of judicial 
behavior.  Finally, inferior courts lack the (relative) freedom, as well as the ultimate responsibility, of 
the Supreme Court.  See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES:  A PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 168–69 (2006) (noting that “[t]he scrutiny that the justices receive may heighten 
their sense of accountability” and that, as a result, “the bases for the justices’ choices may differ system-
atically from those of judges on lower courts—including themselves, if they had lower-court experi-
ence”). 
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In his interesting new book,10 Lawrence Baum has offered such a the-
ory.  It has the attraction of recognizing that, like all human beings,11 judges 
have a number of audiences that may influence them.  Professor Baum dis-
cusses the possibility that Justice Blackmun’s changing preferences re-
flected his response to his social environment, including the media—the 
“Greenhouse effect.”12  He also notes, however, a number of other possible 
influences, including that suggested by my experience as a law clerk:  col-
legial influence.13  Linda Greenhouse suggests a similar phenomenon in dis-
cussing Justice O’Connor, who appears to have been influenced by Justice 
Marshall.14
A theory of preference change presumably should distinguish between 
sincere and strategic behavior,15 although positing a sharp dichotomy be-
tween the two may neglect both human nature and the impact of other in-
fluences, including precedent and other institutional considerations.16  
Could it be that the drift observed after Justice Rehnquist became Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist17 reflected in part his desire to assign majority opinions and 
to do so without engaging in the alleged behavior for which his predecessor 
was criticized?18  Does the desire to exercise the power of being the “swing 
justice” lead to strategic behavior, and for how long should adherence to the 
 
10  See BAUM, supra note 9.  For a similar perspective on judicial behavior in the United Kingdom, 
employing role analysis, see ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS (1982); id. at 9–34 (chapter entitled 
“Who Influences Law Lords?”). 
11  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7 (link)(“All the world’s a stage, And all the 
men and women merely players:  They have their exits and their entrances; And one man in his time 
plays many parts . . . .”). 
12  See BAUM, supra note 9, at 139–57. 
13  See id. at 152. 
14  See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Who Change:  A Response to Epstein et al., 101 NW. U. L. REV 
(forthcoming 2007), 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 132, 134–135, http://www.law.northwestern. 
edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/9/ (link) (citations infra will refer to the Colloquy). 
15  But see Epstein et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 31) (conflating strategic with sincere behavior 
in discussing “the political environment in which the justice operates” as one of the “underlying, and 
universal, explanations of change on the Court”).  Professor Baum discusses strategic behavior 
prompted by “concern for the regard of colleagues,” distinguishing it from the “standard conception, [in 
which] judges act strategically within their courts only because they care about the content of court deci-
sions.”  BAUM, supra note 9, at 55. 
16  See Greenhouse, supra note 14, at 134–135 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s vote in 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (link)). 
17  See Epstein et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 24). 
18  See id. (manuscript at 42) (discussing votes by Chief Justice Rehnquist that appear to reflect 
changing preferences but likely did not contribute to doctrinal change).  For allegations that Chief Jus-
tice Burger acted both insincerely and disingenuously in order to assign opinions, see, for example, BOB 
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT  64–65, 170–72, 
179–81, 417–22 (1979). 
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positions that enable continued exercise of that power be deemed strategic 
rather than sincere?19
Any theory of judicial preference change must have room for individu-
als some of whose preferences are immutable.  This group would include 
judges who are ideologues in the strong sense of that word, because their 
preferences “hold sway with such power as to be impervious to adjudicative 
facts, competing policies, or the governing law as it is generally under-
stood.”20  I have argued that ideology, in this sense, is akin to non-
ideological pre-commitment to legal positions for the purpose of securing 
or retaining a judicial position, in that both are the enemies of judicial inde-
pendence. 
Judges whose belief systems are hard-wired are likely to be eager lawmakers; 
those who are pre-committed for reasons of personal advancement may or may 
not be.  In any event, the same qualities that render them unfit to serve as 
judges from a traditional perspective, which views law as determinate knowl-
edge to be discovered, render them equally unfit in a world that acknowledges 
the indeterminacy of much (not all) law and the importance of dialogue in ar-
riving at solutions that serve the common weal.  True believers, no matter what 
their beliefs or political persuasion, know what is right, and the brighter, the 
more self-confident and the more energetic they are, the more likely they are to 
regard processes and institutions of dialogue and accountability as obstructions 
and to endeavor to render them irrelevant.  Non-ideological pre-commitment 
forecloses dialogue, and although motivated by a vision of accountability, con-
tributes to its degradation.21
Like all of us, judges who are strong ideologues probably enjoy, and 
may actively seek, friendly audiences.  But preaching is not dialogue, and 
an audience of the converted is unlikely to stimulate change.22
In this light, the implications of the findings reported by Epstein and 
her co-authors for the judicial appointment process may not be as reassuring 
as they appear.  Consider, for example, how many of the appointments that 
resulted in drift to the left resulted from a political environment that con-
strained a president23 and/or from a president’s choice to pursue a personal 
 
19  A related question, suggested by Epstein’s and her co-authors’ speculations about the voting be-
havior of Justice Kennedy going forward, is whether the assumption of the role of swing justice, whether 
or not sought, prompts strategic (as opposed to sincere) behavior.  See Epstein et al., supra note 4 
(manuscript at 43–44). 
20  Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom:  Independence, Imagination and Ideology in 
the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1971, 1999 (1997).  In my view, ideological stability 
over time need not reflect or result from ideological rigidity. 
21  Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Accountability to the Past, Present, and Future: Precedent, Politics 
and Power, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 48–49 (2005). 
22  See BAUM, supra note 9, at 164–71 (discussing appearances of justices before various groups 
outside of Washington, D.C.); id. at 167 (noting that Justices Scalia and Thomas made the greatest num-
ber of appearances before policy groups outside of Washington). 
23  I would include in this group the nominations of Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Powell, Rehnquist, 
and Stevens. 
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or partisan, as opposed to a pure policy, agenda.24  The more constrained a 
president is by the opposition party, campaign promises, the desire to ap-
peal to certain voters, or friendship, the less room there may be to nominate 
a reliable policy agent. 
In recent decades, however, the growing influence of interest groups in 
judicial appointments and partisan politics has blurred distinctions among 
different appointment strategies.25  As a result, a single-minded president 
with a clear policy agenda and a compliant Senate might be foolish to aban-
don (or compromise on) the quest for reliable policy agents.  Thus, I remain 
worried both that the quest will continue and that it will continue to pollute 
our politics by encouraging the public to regard Bush v. Gore26 not as an 
anomaly but rather as emblematic of what judicial appointments are all 
about—specific results on specific issues.27
By now, of course, my legal colors are showing, and the reader will 
understand why I am uncomfortable with the connection that Epstein and 
her co-authors draw between changing ideological preferences and chang-
ing doctrine.28  I believe that all members of the Court, including its strong 
ideologues, are imbued to some extent with Rule of Law values, and that 
almost all of them understand the importance of adherence to, or rational 
explanations for departures from, precedent.29  My own experiences as a 
law clerk, as an arbitrator, and as a Special Master have shown me that 
some opinions, as they say, simply will not write.  Those experiences and 
exposure to cases in which a justice voted one way in conference only to be 
persuaded to change by a draft opinion (or dissent) convince me that the 
traditional gap between the legal and political science approaches to judicial 
 
24  I would include in this group the nominations of Justices Brennan, Clark, O’Connor and Warren.  
The typology comes from SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES:  LOWER COURT SELECTION 
FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 3–4 (1997). 
25  See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II:  Changing the Tenure of Supreme 
Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511, 1545 (2006).  Epstein and her co-authors neglect this phenome-
non (i.e., the links between ideological and partisan considerations) in their discussion of the appoint-
ment of Justice Alito.  See Epstein et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 6). 
26  538 U.S. 98 (2000) (link). 
27  See Burbank, supra note 25, at 1543–44 (“I have suggested that some distinctions between the at-
tentive and nonattentive public might disappear (or that the definition of ‘attentive public’ might change) 
with greater attention to the Court that was promoted and framed by interest groups.  In that regard, the 
explanation other scholars have offered for the correlation between awareness and diffuse support in-
volves exposure to ‘legitimizing messages.’  If, on the other hand, greater awareness of the Court were 
brought about by delegitimizing messages (i.e., those framed in terms of results), would there not be less 
diffuse support?  Indeed, whatever the dynamic between diffuse and specific support, if the frame were 
altered, might there not be less of both?”) (footnotes omitted). 
28  See Epstein et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 5–6). 
29  Adrian Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory 7 (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (“To make sense of doctrinal scholarship, one must assume either that 
the justices are directly interested in creating good law, or else that the justices are indirectly interested 
in doing so, because they care about their reputation with (among others) the law professors who care 
about good law.”) (footnote omitted). 
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behavior, which has been narrowing in recent years, will not be closed until 
we find a way to model law.30  In sum, I doubt that either an attitudinal or a 
strategic model of judicial behavior can explain a decision like Jones v. 
Bock.31
Perhaps, however, Epstein and her co-authors do not disagree.  For, af-
ter all, they believe that their findings “counsel against ideological ap-
pointments—at the least, ideological appointments to the neglect of other 
factors but especially a nominee’s qualifications . . . .”32  And what would 
attention to qualifications (or, as they also put it, “merit”) accomplish?  It 
would provide greater assurance, if not of the “ideological direction of 
[nominees’] doctrinal path,” then of “their ability to influence the direction 
of the law, based in some part on their intellect.”33  One need not endorse 
Epstein’s and her co-authors’ peculiar sample of those “universally ac-
claimed as great justices [who] were also universally perceived as exceed-
ingly well qualified at the time of their nomination”34 to see in their 
formulation room for recognition that mastery of law and of legal culture 
matters, and that any attempt to store them in a compartment (or model) 
sealed off from ideological preferences is, well, artificial. 
 
30  BAUM, supra note 9, at 172 (“Scholars have made progress in measuring the influence of various 
aspects of the law on judicial behavior.  They have given particular attention to the impact of a court’s 
own precedents, which are easier to measure than some other legal considerations.  But broad measures 
of the law’s impact remain elusive.”) (citations omitted).  See id. at 160 (discussing incentives “to take 
the law seriously”).  For an interesting paper discussing the use of classification trees “[t]o study the 
mapping from case facts to judicial outcomes,” see Jonathan P. Kastellac, The Structure of Legal Rules 
and the Analysis of Judicial Decisions 9 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960190.  
As the author notes, however, “a study of legal rules can proceed without joining th[e] debate [between 
the attitudinal model and the legal model”].  Id. at 4 n.5. 
31  127 S. Ct. 910 (2007) (link)(unanimously rejecting three separate “procedural rules” by which the 
Sixth Circuit made it more difficult for prisoners to maintain civil rights actions).  This “liberal” deci-
sion confounds the assumptions of the attitudinal model with respect to many of the Justices.  The recent 
elections might provide some basis for concern, from a strategic perspective, about a legislative over-
ride.  Yet, that concern is barely plausible with respect to prisoner legislation and wholly implausible as 
to all of the three rules struck down.  As to one of them, the Court’s reliance on precedent invalidating 
judge-made heightened pleading requirements should be taken at face value. 
32  Epstein et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 37).  
33  Id. at 37.  Doubt about the prospects for appointing a reliable policy agent might, however, cause 
a risk averse president not to choose a person with such qualifications, or to hedge his bets in other ways 
(as by nominating an older person). 
34  Id. at 36.  The authors include “Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, William Brennan 
and Antonin Scalia, to name just a few.”  Id. at 36–37.  However, Cardozo is not widely regarded, let 
alone “universally acclaimed,” as a great justice, in part because he served for such a short period, and in 
part because his strength lay in the common law.  There is likely to be greater disagreement about 
Scalia.  Arguably, however, he has largely failed to fructify his undoubted “ability to influence the direc-
tion of the law” precisely because he is a strong ideologue who is not interested in dialogue, statesman-
ship, compromise or any of the other qualities that can make the law=politics equation a counsel of hope 
rather than despair.  See Burbank, supra note 21, at 46; Stephen B. Burbank, Making Progress the Old-
Fashioned Way, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1234–35 (2001). 
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